The "cost of begging" is a prominent prediction of costly signalling theory, suggesting that 22 offspring begging has to be costly in order to be honest. More specifically, it predicts that there 23 is a single cost function for the offspring (depending on e.g. offspring quality) that maintains 24 honesty and it must be proportional to parent's fitness loss. Here we show another 25 interpretation of the cost. We demonstrate that cost, proportional to the fitness gain of the 26 offspring, also results in honest signalling. Since the loss of the parent does not necessarily 27 coincide with the gain of the offspring, it is provable that any linear combination of the two cost 28 functions (one proportional to parent's loss, one to offspring's gain) also leads to honest 29 signalling. Our results, applied for a specific model, support the previous general conclusion that 30 signalling games have different cost functions for different equilibria. Consequently, costly 31 signalling theory cannot predict a unique equilibrium cost in signalling games especially in case 32 of parent-offspring conflicts. As an important consequence, any measured equilibrium cost in 33 real cases has to be compared both to the parent's fitness loss and to the offspring's fitness gain 34 in order to provide meaningfully interpretation. 35 36
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Consequently, they claimed that the offspring's condition (and its expected benefit due to the 53 received resource) influences the signalling cost only to the extent that it influences the 54 parent's loss of fitness. Here we extend their model and prove that their solution is not unique 55 and that there is another equilibrium with honest signalling where their claim does not apply, 56 but which can be readily derived from their equations [17] . At this second equilibrium, the 57 cost of signalling is proportional to the expected fitness benefit of the offspring, and 58 (analogously to the other case) the parent's fitness loss affects the signalling cost only to the 59 extent it affects the offspring's gain. Moreover, any linear combination of these two cost 60 functions provides an equilibrium with honest signalling. Thus, there is an infinite number of 61 distinct equilibria where honest signalling exists. 62 They have calculated the fitness functions of the two parties, parent and offspring. The parent is 65 interested in the condition of the offspring to transfer the least amount of resource to maximize 66 its own inclusive fitness (all future offspring included) whereas the offspring is interested in 67 receiving the most amount of resource possible to maximize its own inclusive fitness (all future 68 siblings included). The offspring's condition is described by a strictly positive continuous variable 69 (c). The requirement for signalling stems from the fact that the parent cannot asses this condition 70 directly. The offspring, however, can opt to engage in communication with a (costly) signal (x). 71
In the original model of Nöldeke and Samuelson, x denoted both the level (intensity) and the 72 cost of the signal [17] . Here, we introduce function f(x) as the cost of the signal, and reserve x to 73 denote only the intensity of the signal (depending on the condition c) in order to avoid potential 74 confusion. 75
The parent has control over Z amount of resource that it has to divide between the 76 offspring and itself, where offspring receives part z of Z and parent retains part y = Zz. The 77 inclusive fitness functions of offspring and parent (v and u, respectively, after [17]) are: 78
where h(c, z) and g(Zz) are the direct fitness gains of offspring and parent, respectively, when 81 z amount of resource is transferred to offspring. Both h and g are assumed to be continuously 82 differentiable and increasing functions (accordingly strictly decreasing with z).  is the coefficient 83 of relatedness between current offspring (and any future siblings from the parent); and  is the 84 coefficient of relatedness of the parent to its current (and future) offspring. The offspring 85 strategy is the level of solicitation (x) as function of the offspring's quality (c), whereas the 86 parental strategy is the level of shared resource (z) as a function of offspring solicitation (x). 87
88
Conditions of the honest signalling equilibrium 89 A stable equilibrium of honest signalling requires three conditions to be met: (i) signals must be 90 honest, (ii) parents have to respond to signals and (iii) the equilibrium must be evolutionarily 91 stable. The latter condition implies that there is a pair of optimal parent and offspring strategies 92 (z*(x), x*(c)) from which it does not worth departing unilaterally for any of the participants [17] . 93
At an honest equilibrium, parents know the condition of the offspring as their signal of need 94 directly corresponds to their level of need. Thus, the parent's equilibrium strategy has to 95 maximize the parent's inclusive fitness u for any given c, i.e. the following inequality must hold 96 Analogously to parent, offspring's equilibrium strategy is to maximize its own inclusive 103 fitness v given the parental equilibrium strategy z * (x) and the condition of the offspring c. 
Results

113
The argument of Nöldeke and Samuelson [17] is as follows: the cost of signal at equilibrium 114 has to dispense the conflict of interest between parent and offspring. Accordingly, the two 115 solution functions of h and g of the optimization problems of parent and offspring have to 116
give the same result (see [18] for more general results). In the absence of signalling cost, at 117 the maximum of the offspring's inclusive fitness, the following conditions must be met: 118
where subscripts denote derivatives with respect to the variable. At the optimum, the 121 derivatives of the two components of the fitness gain must equal: 122
the offspring's point of view (Eq. 8a) than from the parent's point of view (Eq. 9a), hence they 126 maximize different functions. Thus, there is a clear conflict of interest between parent and 127
offspring. An illustration of this conflict and the corresponding trade-off can be seen on Figure 1 . 128
The shape of these trade-offs is different since the weights of the parental fitness component 129 (fitness) of the offspring and the parent respectively when the resource allocation is optimal for 135 the other party. Clearly the dots do not overlap with the stars, hence the optimal resource 136 allocation of one party is not optimal for the other. (Eq. 13) 153
Clearly, in the absence of signal cost, the marginal fitness gain of the parent (as a function of 154 resource allocation) is different from the offspring's point of view (Eq. 11) than from the parent's 155 point of view (Eq. 12). This still implies the conflict of interest. Following the same logic as above, 156 at the honest signalling equilibrium, these equations have to provide the same results. That is, 157 the parent's optimum has to be the same, viewed either from the offspring's or from the parent's 158 aspect. Thus, just as before, the difference between the right-hand sides of Eqs. 11 and 12 gives 159 the cost that has to be subtracted from the offspring fitness so that the two equations result in 160 the same optimum. The cost function we propose is: 161
(Eq. 14) 162 and the cost at equilibrium is:
The existence of the signalling equilibrium can be proved as before (see ESM Appendix 2). 165
So far, we have proved that there are two honest signalling equilibria corresponding to 166 two different cost functions. Since each of these cost functions can remove the conflict of 167 interest between parent and offspring, it follows that any linear combination of the functions 168 is also a solution to the optimization problem. Thus, the general cost function of the optimum 169 strategies is as follows: 170 Figure 3A show the new cost function, Figure 3C Red, yellow and green curves show the signal cost along the equilibrium path (f1(x*(c)) and 202
f2(x*(c))). This cost can be calculated by substituting z with the amount of optimal parental 203 investment ̃= ln / into Eqs. 17 and 18. Figure 4A shows how these equilibrium costs 204 compare to each other as a function of offspring quality c. Note, while the absolute value of 205 the equilibrium signal cost is different for each cost function but the partial derivative with 206 respect of z is the same along the equilibrium path (see Figure 4F , G and H). Figure 4E Another important implication of our results and the above considerations is that it is not 234 possible to decide in case of a real population (based on game theoretical models alone) 235 which one of the infinite numbers of costly honest equilibria will be achieved (provided that 236 an honest separating equilibrium exists). In order to answer questions of which evolutionary 237 trajectory will be played out (or have been taken), a more dynamic approach is needed [10] . seriously the evolutionary consequences. This is left for future work. 242
Since the publication of Godfray's [7] influential model, a lot of empirical research has been 243 carried out to measure the "cost of begging". It was realized very early that the metabolic cost 244 of begging is not unreasonably high [23-25], and thus it probably does not fit the predictions of 245 costly signalling theory. Attempts to try to measure the cost of increased begging on growth 246 provided mixed results [26-28]. However, several types of other costs were proposed, like 247 predation risk [29] [30] [31] , immunological [32-34] or oxidative costs [35] ; for a review, see [36] . We 248 must emphasize, that measuring any cost in absolute value is not enough [22, 37] : the measured 249 costs have to be compared to something, i.e. only relative measures are informative. One of the 250 reasons why the current empirical results are inconclusive is that we don't have any information 251 about how these costs relate to the benefits of the parties, though see Moreno-Rueda and 
